Changes in taxation of corporate dividends offer excellent opportunities to study dividend clientele effects.
Introduction
Despite more than 40 years of studies of corporate dividend policies, questions such as whether potential dividend clienteles affect corporate payout decisions are largely unanswered. Even the existence of dividend clienteles remains unclear. Most of early research has focused on price and volume reactions around dividend events. Those studies explore permanent dividend clienteles indirectly, and their results are mixed. In more recent work, dividend clienteles are observed more directly by studying the holdings of either institutional investors (Dhaliwal et al., 1999; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005) , retail investors (Graham and Kumar, 2006) , or half of an entire market as in Dahlquist et al (2006) . But do firms take the tax status of their owners into account, or is it mainly investors who make their portfolio choices based on firms' existing dividend policies? Pérez-Gonzales (2003) argues that tax preferences of large shareholders influence dividend payout policies in the U.S. Findings by Chetty and Saez (2005) , Blouin, et al. (2007) , and Brown et al (2007) suggest that incentives of owners and managers affect firms' payout policy decisions around tax reforms. Jin (2006) finds that embedded capital gains of institutional holders of the firm affect its choice between share repurchases and dividends. In contrast, survey evidence by Brav, et al. (2005) strongly indicates that firms are reluctant to change their dividend policies to reflect changes in tax preferences among their major shareholders. Similarly, Barclay, et al. (2008) find that when a block trade is made from individual taxed investors to corporate investors with a reduced tax burden on dividend income, the firms fail to take into account the change in the tax preferences of their owners.
In Finland, taxation of dividends changed significantly in 2004 as a full imputation system was abolished, and a system of partial double taxation of corporate income was introduced. The magnitude of the change for individual investors was similar to that studied in Bell and Jenkinson (2002) in the U.K., as the tax burden on dividend income at the personal level in Finland went from zero to 19.6%. In this paper, we study simultaneous reactions to the change in taxation by both firms and investors. By looking at changes in both payout policy when controlling for ownership, and ownership when controlling for payout policy and its tax treatment, we shed light on the interactions between these two factors around a major tax reform. The firms' reaction is measured by observing their dividend and share repurchase policies before and after a tax reform. We include measures of ownership structure to consider whether adjustments to the reform were affected by tax-effects of the firms' main ownership groups. The ownership data is further observed throughout the reform to estimate whether the tax change also resulted in changes in ownership patterns.
One can argue that presence of a large block owner makes firms more likely to adjust their dividend policies to reflect the preferences of such investors. Finnish ownership structures are typically much more concentrated than those in the U.S. and the U.K.
Compared to evidence on ownership patterns in European countries by Barca and Becht (2001) , the Finnish block ownership seems to fall somewhere between the Central European countries and the U.K. Less than 20% of the firms have a block holder owning more than 50% of the shares.
1 Importantly, ownership concentration varies substantially in the cross section of Finnish firms. In the sample used in this study, the ownership share of the top five shareholders varies from 1.5% to 99.9%, with the average fluctuating from year to year around 50%. Combined, the facts that Finnish ownership concentration is between the Central European countries and the Anglo-Saxon countries, and that substantial variation in ownership concentration exists within the Finnish sample, make
Finland an interesting case to study whether firms' ownership patterns affect the likelihood for them to adjust their payout policies.
Our empirical results contrast results by Brav et al (2005) , Baker and Wurgler (2004) , Denis and Osobov (2008) , Brown, et al. (2007) , and Barclay, et al. (2008) , who all provide evidence suggesting that individual ownership does not affect dividend policies.
In reaction to the tax reform, Finnish firms adjusted their payout levels for both dividends and share repurchases based on their ownership structures. Especially in dividend payout decisions, firms take into account the tax effects of their shareholders. In the year prior to the tax reform, we find that ahead of the upcoming dividend taxation at the personal level, firms whose shareholders were more affected by the reform paid out substantially larger amounts to their shareholders. We further find that payout variables are significant determinants of ownership structures.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss related literature. In section 3, we present the main features of the 2004 tax reform in Finland. In section 4, the data is presented. Empirical results are reported in section 5, and summary and conclusions follow in section 6.
Taxes and Dividend Policy
Tax effects of dividends can be traded away if taxed investors sell their high yield stocks to non-taxed investors who capture the dividend and subsequently sell the stocks back to taxed investors. The connection between firms' dividend policies and taxation of their owners becomes irrelevant if owners with varying tax burdens engage in such taxinduced trading around the ex-dividend day. Several authors offer support for dynamic tax-induced trading by reporting abnormal trading volumes around the ex-dividend day.
2 However, the U.S. evidence on dividend taxation as the driving force on trading around the ex-dividend day is mixed. The results by Koski and Scruggs (1998) suggest that traders engage in dividend-capturing trading around the ex-dividend day, but that tax clienteles fail to explain the trading behavior. More recently, Graham and Kumar (2006) study trading behavior of a large sample of U.S. retail investors, and find that their income (and thus their marginal tax rate) significantly affects their trading around the exdividend day. The price drop on the ex-dividend day tends to be smaller than the size of the dividend, 3 which suggests that the value of dividends is not fully traded away in dividend-capturing trade. In Finland, Rantapuska (2008) , and Felixson and Liljeblom (2008) both report evidence consistent with tax-induced trading around the ex-dividend day. Dividends in Finland are normally paid annually, rather than quarterly, which may increase incentives for tax-induced trading around the ex-dividend day, as the amount of dividend relative to transaction costs should increase attractiveness of the activity.
The question of whether investors adjust to firms' dividend policies is considered in several studies of investors' trading behavior around changes in dividend policy, such as dividend changes, initiations or omissions. Mixed evidence on investor adjustment around dividend-altering events is provided by Richardson et al (1986) , and Seida (2001) , as well as by Graham and Kumar (2006) . Binay (2001) finds significant changes in institutional ownership after dividend omissions and initiations. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) study the interactions between investor adjustments and firm payout policy changes by considering both institutional ownership and payout policy adjustments in the U.S. between 1980 and 1996. They find that despite institutional owners in the U.S. seem to prefer dividend-paying firms over non-dividend-paying firms, the level of dividends does not matter, as increases in dividends fail to attract increased institutional holdings. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) further fail to find evidence of an increase in institutional ownership or ownership concentration leading to changes in firms' payout policy. Holmen, et al. (2008) study the tax records of corporate insiders in Sweden to establish their marginal tax rates, which allows them to explore the connection between marginal tax rates of insiders and dividend policy. They find that firms with insiders who have low tax rates pay higher dividends, and also that when insiders with zero tax rates sell blocks, firms tend to adjust by lowering their dividends. In a recent study, Desai and Jin (2008) explore the connection between the presence of dividendaverse institutional investors and firms' payout ratios, and find evidence of both investors adjusting to exogenous changes in the payout policy, and payout policies adjusting to changes in investor composition.
Two recent studies search for evidence of firms catering to dividend clienteles on a country-by-country aggregate level. Denis and Osobov (2008) Tax regime changes typically affect investor preferences between dividends and share repurchases. Brown, et al. (2007) and Blouin, et al. (2007) find support for a substitution of dividends for share repurchases after the 2003 tax change. Blouin, et al. (2007) further report that the substitution is concentrated in firms with high individual ownership, suggesting that firms adjust their payout channels depending on their ownership structure. Grullon and Michaely (2002) also find support for substitution in the U.S. cross section over a longer time horizon. While personal taxes are the most obvious factor affecting the choice between dividends and repurchases, other potential factors also exist. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2005) report that dividends tend to be preferred over share repurchases in the U.K. for firms that have block holders, regardless of those block holders' tax status. They propose strict insider trading rules as a possible explanation, as those rules make share repurchases less appealing for the shareholders with an insider status.
In summary, while existence of dividend clienteles is supported by numerous studies, the evidence on firm's adjusting their payout levels is only emerging, especially outside the U.S. Few studies consider the simultaneous reactions of the firms, and the investors'.
Understanding the interactions is important for firms and investors alike.
The Tax Reform and ownership patterns
Prior to the 2004 tax reform, dividend income taxation in Finland was based on the 1993 legislation, which placed all capital income and corporate profits under a single flat tax rate. Originally, the rate was 25% (in 1993), but it was successively raised to 28% (in 1996) , and finally to 29% (in 2000). Furthermore, a full imputation (avoir fiscal) system applied to dividend distributions, which effectively made dividends tax-free for domestic investors at the personal level. The 2004 reform altered the tax rates both at corporate and personal income level, and more importantly replaced the full imputation system by introducing partial double taxation of corporate profits.
The reform lowered the corporate profits tax rate from 29% to 26% and the flat personal capital income tax-rate from 29% to 28%. Poterba (2004) . As the tax preference ratios reveal, the 2004 reform reduced the preference for dividends for most investor groups, while for some groups, the preference ratio was unaffected by the reform.
Furthermore, Table 1 cause minor deterioration in our sample so that the final full sample consists of 524 firmyear observations for 148 different firms. To avoid further deterioration, we use a substitution method to replace missing data points for firm characteristics that we use as control variables. In the substitution method a missing data point is replaced by the cross sectional average for the data item in that year.
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Descriptive statistics for various measures of dividend payout and profitability, along with other firm characteristics, are reported in Table 3 . The table provides information regarding both the full sample and two subsamples that are based on the extent to which the firm's top five owners were affected by the tax change. The table indicates very high dividend payouts during the period, as the mean payout ratio is over 140% and the mean dividend yield is 4.54%. Out of all holdings by top five owners, the proportion held by investors who were affected by the tax change is approximately 55%, but that percentage varies substantially across firms (averages are 21% and 88% in the two subgroups, respectively). As Table 3 indicates, the two subgroups deviate significantly in size, market-to-book ratio, leverage, and foreign ownership. We control for all these factors in our regression models.
Empirical analysis
We report the evolution of dividend payouts, dividend yields, and share repurchases during our sample years in Table 4 . The table segregates the sample into two groups of firms, based on whether the total equity ownership of those among the top 5 shareholders who were affected by the tax reform is higher or lower than 30%. The 30% cut-off point is arbitrarily drawn in an attempt to identify a level of reasonably large corporate influence by the tax-affected owners. Since the dividend payout variable exhibits extreme positive skewness due to some firms paying high dividends despite low earnings, we have truncated our payout ratio variable at the level of 10. In Table 4 , Panel A, we report statistics on the dividend payout ratio for the full (truncated) sample, as well as for a restricted sample, where payouts higher than 800% have been excluded. 6 The asterisks in the table indicate statistical significance in the difference between the two groups at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels. Due to the relatively small sample sizes in the sub-groups, we use the bootstrapped t-test for means, and the non-parametric median test for medians. The key statistics are also illustrated in Figure 2 . According to Panel B of Table 4 , the difference in dividend yield for 2002 (5.57% versus 3.7%) is significant at the 10% level. Tax-affected owners are largely private owners. As they faced a zero tax on dividends prior to the reform, the finding that their ownership among top five shareholders is connected to higher dividend yields before the reform is consistent with taxation of dividends affecting either investors' portfolio choices or firm's payout policies.
In 2003, dividends increase in both groups in anticipation of the reform of 2004, but the increase is more profound for firms with more tax affected owners. The mean (together with median) payout ratio is significantly higher for the tax-affected group in 2003, when using the restricted sample ( Prior to the reform, share repurchases are more common in firms dominated by owners who are not affected by the reform. That group includes foreign owners, who, as mentioned above, were in a tax-disadvantage regarding dividend income prior to the taxation change. After the reform, share repurchases increase in both groups, and the mean levels of share repurchases become more closely aligned between the two groups. 
Determinants of dividend payout
Next, we move to more rigorous analysis of the determinants of dividends, share repurchases and tax clientele ownership structure around the tax reform of 2004 with multiple regression models. We use the dividend Pay-Out Ratio (PAY-OUT), the Share Repurchases to Total Payable (REPURCHASES) and the proportion of tax-sensitive owners among the top 5 shareholders (TAXED OWNERS), as dependent variables in these models.
Studies of dividend payouts and cash distributions are often are based on Lintner's (1956) early work. Lintner's partial adjustment model builds on the assumptions that dividends convey signals about the firm's earnings, and that dividend pay-out ratios are sticky, with firms being reluctant to lower them. Consequently, managers consider future sustainability of the firm's earnings before altering the dividend policy. In the partial adjustment model, the change in dividend is explained by prior dividend payout and prior and current profitability. Both profitability and prior payout are expected to have a positive impact on the current payout. The constant term is also expected to have a positive sign, to reflect firms' reluctance to reduce dividends.
In our simplest regression specification in Column (1) of Table 5 , the lagged payout ratio and current and lagged ROA are the only variables explaining the current payout ratio. In line with predictions of Lintner (1956) , the dividend payout ratios are positively related to prior payout ratios and prior and current profitability.
Firms' dividend payment behaviour in different countries may vary depending on factors such as accounting standards and practices, and also the structure of the local financial markets. For example, Goergen, et al. (2005) interesting, as it captures the effect of ownership structure on "last minute" distributions prior to the new tax regulations coming into effect. 8 The results are reported in Column (2) of Table 5 Table displays annual descriptive statistics for dividend payouts both with and without extreme observations (payout > 8). Each measure is reported for two types of firms: companies where the owners affected by the tax reform own less than 30% of the total amount of shares owned by the 5 largest shareholders, and firms where that ownership category owns more than 30%. The sample focuses on firm payouts referring to accounting years of 2002 to 2005, and consists of firms traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HEX). The difference between the two ownership groups is tested using a bootstrapped t-test for means and a medians test for medians, with ***, **, * indicating statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
In Column (3) of Table 5 , we further include a number of firm-specific control variables.
A motive for a firm to signal with dividends is expected to be stronger if the firm is perceived by insiders to be undervalued. We include the stock return for the past six months (PAST RETURN), and the market to book ratio (MKT-TO-BOOK) to control for this potential effect on payouts. Firms with high free cash flow may have an incentive to offer higher dividend payouts to reduce their agency problems (Jensen, 1986) , which is why we include free cash flow (FCF) as a control variable 9 . The foreign ownership variable (FOREIGN OWN) is set to capture effects of a differential treatment of foreign owners, reported by Liljeblom and Pasternack (2006) . Foreign owners faced a 15% withholding tax on dividends during our sample period, which made them an investor category with a reduced preference for dividends prior to the reform. Larger, more mature firms may have more permanent payout policies, and also smaller growth opportunities, which motivate us to include the natural logarithm of sales (SIZE) as a control variable. Finally, high financial leverage may reduce dividends for firms that are financially constrained, or alternatively indicate higher payouts for firms with low cash flow volatility, as they may be able to both carry a heavier debt load and sustain higher dividend payouts. To control for both of these effects, we include leverage (LEVERAGE)
in our regression models. The results of our full model in Column (3) of Column (4) of Table 5 , and they are very similar to those reported in Column (3).
Interestingly, none of the ownership type dummies exhibits a significant sign. We can therefore conclude that tax-effects dominate any other ownership type specific effects on payout policy.
Our sample includes financial firms, which are commonly left out of corporate finance studies due to differences in accounting practices between financial and industrial firms.
We do the same in Column (5) of Table 5 gains further strength. Also, free cash flow (FCF) enters now with a positive and significant sign, in support of an agency cost motivation for higher dividend payouts. It is also interesting to note that the vast shift in dividend payouts that occurred around the tax reform is explained by our independent variables to the extent that none of the year dummies is significant in either column (4) or (5) of Table 5 . (5), the results regarding the effect of taxation of main owners become slightly stronger in that sample (results not reported).
As noted above, many firms paid extraordinary dividends during the run-up to the new dividend tax regulation. In the final column of In summary, the results in Table 5 indicate the reduction in dividends following the 2004 reform. The payouts were significantly higher immediately prior to the reform among firms whose ownership were to face the most negative consequences of the tax reform.
These findings are robust to controlling for various variables that have been found to affect dividend payouts in prior literature. The findings are also robust to various ways to consider firms' payout behaviour.
Results for share repurchases
To further test the changes in cash distribution around the 2004 tax reform, we analyze share repurchases during our sample period. In the next set of regressions, we use a measure of share repurchases (REPURCHASES, defined as share repurchases divided by total equity capital available for distribution) as the dependent variable. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6 .
In Column (1) of Table 6 , we test for changes in repurchase activity during the sample years with year dummies for years [2003] [2004] [2005] . As before, year 2002 acts as a control group. Opposite to dividend payouts in Table 5 , each year enters with a positive sign. The size of the coefficient grows much larger when moving from 2003 to 2004, suggesting that a shift from dividends to share repurchases occurred at that time (recall that a similar but opposite shift was reported in Table 5 , regarding dividend payouts). However, none of the year dummies is statistically significant. We also include ownership variables of In Column (2) of Table 6 , we include the firm control variables that we used in Table 5 , except for FOREIGN OWN, which is added in Column (3). TAXED OWNERS loses its statistical significance in Column (2), and in Column (3), FOREIGN OWN seems to absorb most of the effect of tax-sensitive ownership (the two variables have a correlation coefficient of -0.34). Among control variables, size appears to affect share repurchases positively, and firms with high foreign ownership are much more likely to repurchase their shares. The latter finding is in line with foreign owners being in a tax disadvantage regarding dividend distributions during the first part of the sample.
In the final column of Table 6 , we again include dummies for individual ownership types, with Private Persons as the omitted group. While the reported results are not markedly different between columns (3) and (4), two of the ownership types, namely Mutual Funds and Listed Companies, enter the regression with a negative and significant sign. Both ownership groups receive tax-free dividends both before and after the reform, reducing their incentive to demand share repurchases. Also, for listed companies, capital gains are taxable. Furthermore, during our sample period, some mutual funds have been able to report their performance relative to a price index that does not include dividends, giving
those funds yet another reason to prefer dividends over share repurchases. 
Ownership and payouts
Next, we explore potential endogeneity of tax-sensitive ownership, and its effect on firms' cash distribution policy. In the regression models shown in Table 7, TAXED OWNERS is the dependent variable, and we include payout and share repurchase variables among the explanatory variables. Studies of cross-sectional ownership patterns, mainly ownership concentration, often follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , who provide evidence of corporate ownership being endogeous. In their empirical model, they explain ownership concentration in the U.S. with size, control potential proxied by different risk measures, and dummies for regulatory issues in certain industries. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , further include leverage and firm performance among explanatory variables of ownership concentration.
Our ownership models follow Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) , with the exception that we exclude firm specific risk from the models. The variable was not significant in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) . Furthermore, the Finnish market includes a number of small (and family controlled) firms in high-risk industries, such as the IT-sector, which makes is less likely that high risk would be connected with low ownership concentration in the country.
Larger firms are less likely to have a high concentration of tax-sensitive (mostly private)
ownership. We control for that effect with our SIZE variable. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that higher leverage brings about increased monitoring, which in turn may discourage managerial entrenchment through high insider ownership. Accordingly, we also include LEVERAGE in our ownership specifications. While our dependent variable is not management ownership, substitution of private control by creditor control motivates an expected negative sign also in our case. Ownership variables tend to be related to profitability and firm valuation (see e.g. Maury 2006 for family firms in Europe), which is why we include ROA and MARKET-TO-BOOK among our control variables.
Finally, we include an interaction variable PAY-OUT x (Y2004 + Y2005) to test for a differential effect on ownership structure based on payouts after the tax reform. A similar variable is also included for share repurchases.
Column (1) of Table 7 indicates a negative and significant relation between share repurchases and tax-sensitive ownership. The payout ratio has an opposite effect on taxsensitive ownership, and becomes statistically significant in Column (2), where two insignificant variables are dropped. Among control variables, SIZE, MKT-TO-BOOK, and LEVERAGE significantly explain ownership by owners affected by the 2004 tax reform. The interaction terms are statistically insignificant, but the interaction dummy for PAY-OUT has the expected sign (we expect a lower interest in dividends after the tax reform). In Column (3) of Table 7 , we only include firms where the top five shareholders combined own more than 30% of the shares. The results are very similar to those reported in Column (2). Finally, in Column (4), we leave out REPURCHASES, to only concentrate on the connection between payouts and ownership. Our findings regarding payouts and their shift in the post-reform time period gain strength, with even the interaction variable being very close to statistical significance at the 10% level. 
5.4.Testing for interactions: results from 3SLS
To further observe the extent to which not only firms but also owners adjusted to the Finally, results of the last stage of our 3SLS analysis show that owners affected by the tax reform concentrate in smaller firms with higher dividend payouts, and higher market-tobook ratios. The result is particularly strong for the payout ratio (a z-statistic in excess of 5.6), which appears to be the most important determinant of ownership clienteles. As individual investors were one of the main investor groups affected by the reform so that their presence is captured to a large extent with the TAXED OWNERS variable, our findings provide at least indirect support for international evidence on individuals preferring dividend-paying stocks (e.g. Dong et al 2003, Graham and Kumar 2006 In summary, the simultaneous analysis suggests that firms adjust dividends around the tax reform, taking into account the tax clienteles. Furthermore, payout policy appears to be an important determinant of ownership structure. The interaction between these will be further studied in robustness tests in the next section.
5.4.Robustness tests
As a robustness test, we re-examine our earlier empirical tests with panel data estimation.
The results are reported in Table 9 . The two columns differ only in that the second column is run with a balanced panel, whereas the first column contains all the firm-year observations that were part of the earlier analysis. The most striking difference between these results and those reported in Table 5 is that TAXED OWNERS enters with a negative and significant sign. In other words, when both pre-and post-reform data is included and firm-specific effects are controlled for, tax-sensitivity of owners is inversely related to dividend payouts. This may be partially explained by the lowered preference for dividends among tax-affected owners after the reform. Namely, the indicator variables, especially that for year 2003, indicate that in the pre-reform years, tax-sensitive ownership is having a positive effect on dividend payouts, which is consistent with our earlier findings, and supports the hypothesis that firms with greater ownership share by shareholders who suffered from the reform distributed more cash in form of dividends during the run-up to the new law.
There are no noticeable differences in results between the full data set and the balanced panel. Hausman test indicates random effects as the more appropriate technique for the share repurchase model. In the third and fourth columns of Table 9 , we report findings using that technique, again for both full sample and a balanced panel. The regression fails to detect any statistically significant determinants of share repurchases, as none of our explanatory variables enters with a significant coefficient. Even FOREIGN OWN, which has a positive and significant effect on share repurchases according to Table 6 results, is no longer significant. These results suggest that other firm-variables may exist behind the observed share repurchase patterns. Far fewer firms committed share repurchases than dividend payments during our sample years, which makes it difficult for a cross-sectional regression model to detect statistical patterns behind the behaviour.
Finally, we estimate two firm fixed-effects models with TAXED OWNERSHIP as the dependent variable, in columns 5 and 6 of Table 9 . Both models indicate that the presence of tax-sensitive owners increases with high dividend payouts and decreases with high share repurchases (the latter finding is not statistically significant in the balanced panel, however). Furthermore, in the years after the reform, payouts have a negative effect on ownership by investors who were affected by the law change. The latter finding was not statistically significant earlier in Table 7 , but now offers added support for the connection between ownership structure and the tax treatment of dividends.
Overall, the results in Table 9 are very consistent with the findings reported earlier, suggesting that firm-level effects that are controlled for in the panel data estimation were not driving our earlier results. The connection between ownership structure and dividend payouts becomes only stronger in these tests.
Extraordinary dividends
We finally examine firms' probability to pay extraordinary dividends. In Finland, corporate dividends are typically paid in one annual payment. However, a firm can at an extraordinary general meeting, obtain a permission to pay out a separate, extraordinary dividend. Recall that in Table 5 , we considered ordinary dividend payouts separately from extraordinary dividends. In a given year, extraordinary dividends are rare in
Finland. During our sample period, excluding the year 2003, extraordinary dividends were paid out in 19 firm-years out of a total sample of 524 (a probability of 3.6%). When year 2003 is included, the probability of extraordinary dividends jumps to 9.7%. The upcoming reform had a clear impact on extraordinary dividends. The percentage of firms paying extraordinary dividends in 2003 was thus 23.9%. Assuming that extraordinary dividend payment is a random event that follows a binomial distribution with the overall probability of 9.7% as the "success rate", the probability of getting as many as 32 events out of 134 in 2003 is highly significant at the 1% level (with a p-value of 0.0000). Table 5 presented evidence of firms whose owners were affected by the tax reform altering their payout behaviour regarding regular dividends. In order to explore whether firms' extraordinary dividend payment behaviour was also driven by clientele issues, we observe differences in the sub-samples of firms that paid extraordinary dividends in 2003 and firms that did not. The average value for variable TAXED OWNERS is 67% for payees of extraordinary dividends, as compared to 53% for firms not paying extraordinary dividends. The difference between the averages is statistically significant at the one percent level (t = 2.96). We conclude that both ordinary dividend payouts and extraordinary dividend decisions were affected by the effect of the 2004 tax reform on firms' major shareholders.
Summary
Tax regime changes offer unique opportunities to study how firms as well as investors react. We provide evidence on changes in dividend and share repurchase policies, as well as changes in large portfolio holdings, around a major dividend tax reform that occurred in Finland in 2004. The reform introduced double taxation of corporate income, as after it, 70% of dividends are taxable income at the personal level. Among the five largest shareholders of each Finnish firm, on average 54% (25% of total equity) were affected adversely by the tax reform. We find that firms increased dividends during the last year of the old tax system, when dividends were still untaxed at the investor level. This behavior was significantly more prevalent in firms where a higher percentage of ownership was in hands of shareholders who were negatively affected by the reform.
After the reform, dividend payouts decline across all firms. We also find a significant increase in share repurchases after the reform.
We also explore the determinants of ownership, and ownership changes. Payout policy variables seem to affect ownership structure of Finnish firms, so that investor groups that were affected by the reform altered their holdings depending on dividend payouts.
However, while our evidence on firms' reaction to the tax reform is strong, we fail to find statistically significant evidence of investors doing so.
